Israeliranian War Spreads Across Gulf, Closes Hormuz; Europe Politely Declines Invitation to Make It Worse

MIDDLE EAST / EUROPE — Less than three weeks after the United States and Israel opened their war against Iran, the conflict had spread across the Persian Gulf, disrupted roughly a fifth of the world’s petroleum trade, shut airports, sent missiles toward neighboring countries and convinced Formula One that perhaps everybody should stay home.

This came as a surprise primarily to people who had been assured that a major war with Iran would remain tidy.

The conflict began February 28 with a massive U.S.-Israeli air assault on Iran. Tehran retaliated against Israel and Gulf Arab states hosting American military facilities, while subsequent attacks and counterattacks struck military sites, ports, hotels, airports and energy infrastructure across a region that had not volunteered to become the supporting cast. Gulf officials and analysts told Reuters that resentment was growing because their countries had neither initiated nor endorsed the conflict but were absorbing its economic and military consequences.

By March 11, regional airspace closures had contributed to roughly 40,000 canceled flights, which Reuters described as the largest disruption to international air travel since the COVID-19 pandemic. Oil and gas traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, normally responsible for around one-fifth of global petroleum and LNG movements, had effectively halted.

It turns out that starting a war beside one of civilization’s most important energy arteries can affect commerce.

Economists continue studying this newly discovered phenomenon.

By March 14, Reuters reported that the war had killed more than 2,000 people, mostly in Iran, while the Hormuz shutdown had created what it described as the largest oil-supply disruption on record. Oman and Egypt were attempting to mediate, but both Washington and Tehran were rejecting the available paths toward a ceasefire: the Trump administration rebuffed efforts to begin negotiations while Iranian officials said they would not negotiate while American and Israeli attacks continued.

The White House said President Donald Trump remained focused on weakening Iran’s military capabilities and intended to continue Operation Epic Fury.

The peace presidency had entered its Epic Fury phase.

To be clear, Iran’s retaliation against neighboring Gulf countries is no more absolved by the fact that the United States and Israel initiated the war. Gulf governments had told Tehran that their territory and airspace would not be used for the attacks, yet Iran nevertheless launched missiles and drones toward states including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. Gulf officials condemned those actions as attacks on countries that had attempted to remain outside the conflict.

War possesses a remarkable capacity for manufacturing additional enemies.

It is among the industry’s most reliable products.

Trump also threatened further attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure and called upon allied countries to contribute warships toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In one public message, he said the United States would meanwhile continue attacking the Iranian shoreline and destroying Iranian vessels. Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, maintained that Hormuz should remain closed.

The administration therefore found itself asking allies to help manage a global shipping emergency produced by a war many of those allies had advised against starting.

Europe’s response could approximately be translated as: No, thank you.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told parliament that Washington had neither consulted Germany adequately nor provided a convincing plan for the operation’s success. Germany, France and Britain rejected direct participation in the U.S.-Israeli military campaign. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius summarized his government’s position with uncommon diplomatic efficiency: it was not Germany’s war, and Germany had not started it.

Public opinion supported that reluctance. Reuters cited polling showing the war opposed by 49% of Britons against 28% supporting it, while 58% of Germans opposed the conflict. In Spain, where the government denounced the attack, one poll put opposition at 68%.

Trump responded by criticizing allies who refused to join, calling their decision foolish and attacking British Prime Minister Keir Starmer personally.

Nothing reassures hesitant coalition partners quite like reminding them why they were hesitant.

The diplomatic fracture also arrived months after Trump’s pressure campaign against Greenland, territory belonging to NATO ally Denmark. Reuters noted that European governments were already managing strained transatlantic relations over Greenland, Ukraine and tariffs before being asked to contribute military assets to another American-led conflict.

The contradiction with Trump’s political brand had by March become difficult to keep entirely inside the merchandise.

For years, MAGA politics sold Trump partly as the strongman who would avoid unnecessary wars, end other people’s conflicts through superior dealmaking and reject the interventionist foreign-policy establishment. In February, American and Iranian diplomats had still been negotiating. By March, the United States had entered a regional war, shut down a major portion of world energy commerce and begun asking reluctant allies for additional military participation.

It is possible to argue that the war is strategically necessary.

It is rather harder to argue that it is not a war.

And while governments exchanged missiles, the consequences migrated rapidly into ordinary life.

On March 14, Formula One canceled its Bahrain and Saudi Arabian Grands Prix, originally scheduled for April 12 and 19. Iranian missiles and drones had struck around Gulf capitals, regional airports had closed, and F1 faced a March 20 freight deadline for moving equipment into Bahrain. Rather than improvising a racing series around active missile defense, officials reduced the season from 24 races to 22.

Bahrain’s race alone was estimated to generate approximately $45 million annually in hosting fees for Formula One, with Saudi Arabia believed to pay still more. Formula Two, Formula Three and the F1 Academy also lost their scheduled Gulf rounds.

Formula One had encountered Middle Eastern instability before. Bahrain’s race was canceled during unrest in 2011, and drivers spent hours debating whether to race in Jeddah in 2022 after a missile and drone attack struck an oil facility near the circuit.

In 2026, apparently, the sport finally located the line.

It was regional war.

The cancellation is trivial next to dead civilians, destroyed infrastructure and displaced families. That is precisely why it serves as a useful cultural marker. Wars stop being abstract foreign-policy arguments when the consequences begin appearing everywhere else: airline boards, gasoline pumps, shipping schedules, investment markets and sporting calendars.

The world begins reorganizing itself around the violence.

And so by the middle of March, a war advertised in Washington as an exercise of strength had become a conflict Gulf states said they never wanted, European allies refused to join, global energy markets could not escape and international sporting organizations could no longer safely schedule around.

The dealmaker had made a deal increasingly difficult for everyone else to get out of.